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I. INTRODUCTION
The emergence of political activism in the 2008 presidential election extended
throughout the country and even to where partisan politics have no place: the public
school classroom. In 2004, the New York City Board of Education enacted a
regulation that prohibited teachers from wearing any material supporting political
candidates or organizations.1 During the 2008 election, teachers who wanted to wear
partisan political buttons in the classroom while teaching claimed that the regulation
violated their First Amendment rights.2 Although the Southern District of New York
ultimately held that the teachers had no First Amendment claim, the court’s decision,
which involved sorting out three different tests and the variations of those tests,
demonstrated the inconsistency between the courts’ approaches to determining the
First Amendment protections of teachers’ in-class speech.3 Some courts allow
teachers to undermine decisions made by elected officials at the state and local levels
about what should be said in the classroom.4 These decisions often take weeks,
months, or even years to make. In these jurisdictions, teachers can interject their
personal views, which may be inconsistent with those of the local community and
school board, and then hide behind the First Amendment as a grant of authority to do
so.5 The Supreme Court has not definitively determined to what extent teachers’
instructional speech is protected by the First Amendment, and the circuits are
currently split on this question.

1

Weingarten v. Bd. of Educ., 591 F. Supp. 2d 511, 514 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (mem).

2

Id.

3

Id. at 515-20.

4

This Note explains how by applying either the Hazelwood or Pickering tests, courts will
sometimes protect teachers’ speech in the classroom, and by doing this, courts allow teachers
to undermine curricular decisions made by state and local governments. See infra note 65
(discussing which courts apply the Hazelwood or Pickering tests).
5

Infra note 65.
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The majority of the circuits6 apply either the precedent set forth in Hazelwood
School District v. Kuhlmeier7 or Pickering v. Board of Education8 to determine
whether or not, and to what extent, teachers’ instructional speech is protected by the
First Amendment. Neither of these tests are appropriate for teachers’ instructional
speech, though, as the context in which these tests were developed is not analogous
to that of teachers’ speech in public schools. Recognizing the pitfalls of the other
two tests, the Third Circuit relied on Rust v. Sullivan9 to develop a third test.10 Rust
provides a better framework for instructional speech because the Rust line of
precedent stands for the proposition that when the government is the speaker, the
person conveying the message for the government has no First Amendment
protection.11 Under this analysis, when teachers are teaching, they are conveying the
message prescribed by the state and local governments, and as such, teachers have no
First Amendment protection in the classroom.
Section II of this Note begins by giving an overview of how public education is
funded and how national, state, and local governments control instructional speech
based on funding. Section III of this Note examines the three tests currently used to
determine the extent that the First Amendment protects teachers instructional speech:
Hazelwood, Pickering, and Rust. This synopsis will include the facts and holdings of
the cases that laid the framework for each test, the test itself, and how the test is
applied to teachers’ instructional speech. Section IV will then show why the
Hazelwood and Pickering tests are not optimal for instructional speech cases. Once
it is established that these tests have no application in the teachers’ instructional
speech cases, Section IV will show how and why the Rust test best promotes the
interests of the government and teachers in the classroom. This Note concludes that
teachers’ freedom of expression is limited only during actual in class speech, and by
requiring this, the government is merely “insisting that public funds be spent for the
purposes for which they were authorized.”12
II. CREATING AND FUNDING THE CURRICULUM
Because Rust stands for the proposition that when the government funds a
program, the government can insist that funds are being spent for the purposes they
were authorized,13 it is important to show how the federal, state, and local
governments fund public education and how, through funding, the government
controls what is said in the classroom.
6
See Cal. Teachers Ass’n v. Bd. of Educ., 271 F.3d 1141, 1149 n.6 (9th Cir. 2001)
(explaining that all but one of the circuits use either the Hazelwood test or the Pickering test).
7

Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260 (1988).

8

Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563 (1968).

9

Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173 (1991).

10
See Cal. Teachers Ass’n, 271 F.3d at 1149 n.6 (explaining that the Third Circuit uses a
third test, the Rust test (citing Edwards v. Cal. Univ. of Pa., 156 F.3d 488, 491-92 (3d Cir.
1998))).
11

Id.

12

Rust, 500 U.S. at 196.

13

Id.
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A. Federal Level
Although historically, the financing and control of public education belonged to
the state and local governments,14 the federal government’s presence in this area is
constantly expanding.15 The federal government’s role in public education
commenced in 1965 when President Lyndon Baines Johnson signed the Elementary
and Secondary Education Act (ESEA)16 into law as a response to the perceived
failings of the states in education.17 Although the ESEA was originally meant to help
economically disadvantaged children, the bill “became the foundation of modern
education policy.”18 The ESEA remained untouched for over 35 years until
President George W. Bush signed the No Child Left Behind Act (NCLB),19 an Act
which greatly increased federal spending on public education.20 Even though federal
support began in 1965 with a single act, the federal government now has a
Department of Education,21 thirty agencies, and over one hundred programs, all of
which supplement the state and local governments’ role in public education.22
The federal government has a very limited role in public education, as federal
funds and control of those funds only provide assistance to the states.23 States do not
have to accept federal funds; however, acceptance of certain funds is conditioned on
the states’ compliance with the federal law for which the funds were allocated.24
14
Brandi M. Powell, Comment, Take the Money or Run?: The Dilemma of the No Child
Left Behind Act for State and Local Governments, 6 LOY. J. PUB. INT. L. 153, 155 (2005). In
Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954), the Court recognized that “‘education
is perhaps the most important function of state and local governments.’” Mildred Wigfall
Robinson, School Finance Reform: Financing Adequate Educational Opportunity, 14 J.L. &
POL. 483, 484 (1998) (quoting Brown, 347 U.S. at 493).
15
For example, between 1965 and 2007, federal funding for public education for grades
K-12 increased five-fold from $11.8 billon dollars per year to $70.6 billion dollars per year.
Dan Lips, Focus on Education Policy: The Next Chapter in the Tragic History of Federal
Education Policy, 6 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 27, 29 (2008).
16
Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-10, 79 Stat. 27
(1965) (codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. § 6301 (2006)); see also Lips, supra note 15, at 28.
17

Powell, supra note 14, at 156.

18

Lips, supra note 15, at 28.

19

No Child Left Behind Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-110, 115 Stat. 1425 (2002)
(codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. § 6301 (2006)).
20

Lips, supra note 15, at 31.

21

President Jimmy Carter created the Department of Education in 1979. Id. at 28.

22

Powell, supra note 14, at 158-59. See generally U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., 10 FACTS ABOUT
K-12 EDUCATION FUNDING 4 (2005), http://www.ed.gov/about/overview/fed/10facts/
10facts.pdf (last visited Mar. 25, 2010) (listing some of the major programs, as well as the
amount of money the federal government contributed to each program in 2006).
23

U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., supra note 22, at 1.

24

Powell, supra note 14, at 155-56. The U.S. Department of Education even notes that
following federal programs’ “requirements” is voluntarily done by the state, and if the state
does not want to abide by the requirements, the state should not accept the funds. U.S. DEP’T
OF EDUC., supra note 22, at 4.
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Under Title I of NCLB, for example, states must meet federally mandated timelines
of students’ achievements and progress or states could lose federal funding;25
however, it is the states, and not the federal government, that control the standards
that the students have to maintain under the Act.26 Therefore, even though receipt of
federal funds is condition on federal control of funds, the federal government still
does not have nearly as much control on specific school matters as the state and local
governments.27 Not only does the federal government have very little control over
the curriculum, but federal spending accounts for less than ten percent28 of the total
funds for public education, with over ninety percent of funding for public schools
coming from the state and local governments.29
B. State and Local Level
Because the United States Constitution does not mention public education, the
duty of public education rests with the states by virtue of the Tenth Amendment.30
Almost every state constitution includes language that guarantees some form of
public education,31 and while the states’ plenary power over public education derives
from state constitutions, the method of implementation is specified in state statutes.32
In most states, statutes create and delegate powers to administrative agencies, such as
state boards of education or state departments of education.33 These agencies and
departments adopt policies, rules, and regulations needed to conform with statutory
and constitutional requirements.34 Along with creating agencies and departments,
state statutes also regulate the teaching of certain subjects, develop testing programs,
and establish minimum requirements for high school graduation.35

25
20 U.S.C. § 6301 (2006); see also Powell, supra note 14, at 159-65 (discussing specifics
of NCLB).
26

Lips, supra note 15, at 32.

27
See infra text accompanying notes 30-57 (discussing state and local government control
of specific school matters).
28

Lips, supra note 15, at 31 (noting that federal spending for public education has reached
historic highs under NCLB, but only accounts for nine percent of total funding); Powell, supra
note 14, at 158 (explaining that between 1965 and 1997 federal spending was between four
and seven percent).
29

Lips, supra note 15, at 31; Powell, supra note 14, at 158.

30

NATHAN L. ESSEX, SCHOOL LAW AND
EDUCATIONAL LEADERS 2 (3d ed. 2005).

THE

PUBLIC SCHOOLS: A PRACTICAL GUIDE

FOR

31
STUART BIEGEL, EDUCATION AND THE LAW 428 (2006); ROBERT H. PALESTINI & KAREN
F. PALESTINI, LAW AND AMERICAN EDUCATION: A CASE BRIEF APPROACH 5 (2d ed. 2006).
32

PALESTINI & PALESTINI, supra note 31, at 5-6.

33

MICHAEL IMBER & TYLL VAN GEEL, EDUCATION LAW 4 (3d ed. 2004).

34

PALESTINI & PALESTINI, supra note 31, at 6.

35

For a more comprehensive list of what state statutes generally specify, see ESSEX, supra
note 30, at 3-4, IMBER & VAN GEEL, supra note 33, at 3-4, and PALESTINI & PALESTINI, supra
note 31, at 5-6.
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As the educational duty rests with the states, so does the duty to fund public
education. While the federal government contributes some funds to public
education, over ninety percent of the funding derives from the state and local
governments.36 Most states raise capital for education through a “multifaceted
finance system,” with money coming from a combination of the state and local
governments.37 The primary source of state funding derives from sales tax,38
whereas property tax is the primary source of funding for the local districts.39
Although local districts are responsible for levying property taxes, they have the
ability to do so only based on a grant of authority, expressed or implied, from the
state.40 While the amount of interaction between the states and their political
subdivisions can vary,41 the state is chiefly responsible for financing public
education.42
Along with funding, state legislatures have the primary responsibility to specify
the curriculum.43 The most common way the state controls the curriculum is by
mandating specific courses required for high school graduation.44 In most states,
statutes either authorize or prohibit the teaching of certain subjects and topics.45
Some state legislatures provide even more specific and detailed requirements of
course content.46 For example, some “[s]tate testing requirements, such as the
statewide final exams used in New York, create an implicit syllabus” that all districts
36

Lips, supra note 15, at 31; Powell, supra note 14, at 158-59.

37

IMBER & VAN GEEL, supra note 33, at 307.

38

Jeffrey D. Van Volkenburg, What Public Education Should Learn from Major League
Baseball: Spending Caps, Luxury Taxes and Fiscal Accountability, 32 T. MARSHALL L. REV.
237, 242 (2007).
39
Funding through property taxes imposed by the local districts usually accounts for thirty
to fifty percent of public education funds. Id.
40

IMBER & VAN GEEL, supra note 33, at 307.

41

Van Volkenburg, supra note 38, at 242 (noting that “local school systems receive
anywhere between 27 and 77 percent of their funding from the state”).
42

IMBER & VAN GEEL, supra note 33, at 307.

43

Id. at 62.

44

ESSEX, supra note 30, at 4. In Ohio, for example, the Ohio Department of Education
specifies that seniors graduating prior to 2013 must take the following: four units of English
language arts; half a unit of Health; three units each of Math, Science, and Social Studies; half
a unit of Physical Education; and six units of Electives. OHIO BD. OF EDUC., GRADUATION
REQUIREMENTS, http://ode.state.oh.us/ (follow “Teaching” hyperlink; then follow “Instruction”
hyperlink; then follow “Graduation Requirements/Ohio Core” hyperlink; then follow
“Graduation Requirements” hyperlink) (last visited Mar. 25, 2010). The ODE further
specifies that the science units must include one unit of biological studies and one unit of
physical sciences; the social studies units must include half a unit of American history and half
a unit of American government; and the electives must include one unit or two half units in
business, technology, fine arts or foreign language. Id.
45

IMBER & VAN GEEL, supra note 33, at 64-65. For example, some states will require that
the curriculum include patriotic themes and topics. Id. at 65.
46

Id. at 64.
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in the state must follow.47 Testing requirements are not the only way states control
the curriculum. In more than half of the states, the text-book selection process is
done by the state legislatures or through text-book commissions appointed by the
state legislatures.48 While the primary authority of public school curriculum belongs
to the states, all but one49 of the states have voluntarily entrusted local school boards
to fill in the remaining curricular gaps.50
Although minimum standards are developed by state statute, local school boards
establish the specifics concerning the curriculum.51 For example, even when the
states require teaching of a specific course, states usually allow school boards to
construct their own syllabi for that course.52 Furthermore, in states that do not have a
state wide text-book selection process, the selection power belongs to the local
districts.53 More so than the state legislatures, local school boards “affect the
political and cultural perspectives of school programs” by determining specific
courses and topics in the curriculum.54 In some situations, local schools even have
the authority to specify the type of methods of instruction in the schools.55 All stages
of the curriculum, from broad graduation requirements to specific course content,56
are determined through complex methods involving state and local governments.57
While the state and local governments prescribe the curriculum, teachers are
responsible for its implementation.58 Constitutional issues arise when teachers in the
classroom attempt to speak outside of the curriculum.59 Many teachers feel as
though they have a constitutional right to control their own curriculums and
instructional methodologies, a constitutional right known as “academic freedom.”60
47

Id.

48

Id. at 64-65.

49

Hawaii is the only state where the schools are entirely state-run. Id. at 307.

50

Id. at 62.

51

Id.

52

Id. at 66.

53

Id. at 65.

54

Id.

55

Id. at 64-65.

56

Id. at 112-13.

57

Id. at 113.

58

William G. Buss, Academic Freedom and Freedom of Speech: Communicating the
Curriculum, 2 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 213, 256 (1999).
59

Id. at 214.

60

In Rebecca Gose Lynch, Comment, Pawns of the State or Priests of Democracy?
Analyzing Professors’ Academic Freedom Rights Within the State’s Managerial Realm, 91
CAL. L. REV. 1061, 1066 (2003), the author notes that:
The term [academic freedom] actually refers to two different concepts: “professional”
academic freedom and “constitutional” academic freedom. The professional notion
centers on professional ethics of self-governance and autonomy. . . . The
constitutional notion, on the other hand, is legal rather than ethical and was developed
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No court has recognized that teachers have an absolute constitutional right to control
the curriculum,61 as what is taught in the classroom is matter of state and local
control.62 The issue, however, is not as clear when it comes to the First Amendment
rights of teachers in the classroom.
III. TEACHERS’ INSTRUCTIONAL SPEECH AND FIRST AMENDMENT PROTECTION:
TESTS APPLIED
The Supreme Court has never specifically addressed to what extent public
teachers are entitled to First Amendment protection in the classroom.63 The circuits
are split on which test should be applied when answering this question,64 and the
majority use either the Hazelwood test or the Pickering test to reach a conclusion.65
A third test, the Rust test, has been applied in at least one case involving teachers’
instructional speech.66 Very little judicial reasoning exists in the circuits concerning
why a circuit applies one test over another,67 and further confusion arises as the
application of the tests varies among the circuits.68

by courts after professors began to sue for academic speech rights under the First
Amendment.
Id. (footnote omitted). See generally Buss, supra note 58 (focusing on whether academic
freedom is an independent ground for teachers’ free speech under the First Amendment);
Karen C. Daly, Balancing Act: Teachers’ Classroom Speech and the First Amendment, 30 J.L.
& EDUC. 1, 39-41 (2001) (discussing academic freedom and the right to speak); Neal H.
Hutchens, Silence at the Schoolhouse Gate: The Diminishing First Amendment Rights of
Public School Employees, 97 KY. L. J. 37, 56-62 (2008) (looking at academic freedom as a
constitutional concern).
61
Daly, supra note 60, at 40-41; Lynch, supra note 60, at 1068. Although no court has
found teachers have a constitutional right to academic freedom, academic freedom may
nonetheless be used as a defense only when teachers can show “that [they] did not defy
legitimate state and local curriculum directives, followed accepted professional norms for that
grade level and subject matter, discussed matters that were of public concern, and acted
professionally and in good faith when there was no precedent or policy.” PALESTINI &
PALESTINI, supra note 31, at 73-74.
62

ESSEX, supra note 30, at 279.

63

Cal. Teachers Ass’n v. Bd. of Educ., 271 F.3d 1141, 1148 (9th Cir. 2001); see also
Walter E. Kuhn, Note, First Amendment Protection of Teacher Instructional Speech, 55 DUKE
L.J. 995, 997 (2006).
64

Cal. Teachers Ass’n, 271 F.3d at 1149 n.6.

65

Id. (explaining that the First, Second, Seventh, Eighth, and Tenth Circuits use the
Hazelwood test, whereas the Fourth, Fifth, and Ninth Circuits use the Pickering test); Daly,
supra note 60, at 16 (“The Third, Fourth, Fifth, Ninth and D.C. Circuits apply Pickering, while
the First, Second, Seventh, Eighth, and Tenth Circuits employ Hazelwood in their analysis of
teachers’ in class speech.” (footnotes omitted)); Kuhn, supra note 63, at 1001.
66

Edwards v. Cal. Univ. of Pa., 156 F.3d 488, 491 (3d Cir. 1998); see also Cal. Teachers
Ass’n, 271 F.3d at 1149 n.6 (explaining that the Third Circuit uses a third test, the Rust test).
67

Daly, supra note 60, at 17.

68

Id.
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A. The Hazelwood Test
The Hazelwood test originates from the student speech case Tinker v. Des Moines
Independent Community School District.69 Although the test, set out in Tinker and
later refined by Hazelwood, examines the protections of students’ speech in public
schools, the courts have, nonetheless, extended this test to teachers’ speech.
1. Tinker: Laying out the Framework for Hazelwood
In Tinker, the Supreme Court addressed the protections of students’ speech in
public schools.70 After the school administration became aware that a group of
students were planning to wear black armbands to school to protest the Vietnam
War, the school principals of the Des Moines public schools adopted a policy, which
mandated that any student wearing an armband to school would be asked to remove
it and would be suspended for failure to do so.71 When two students were suspended
from school for refusing to remove their armbands,72 the father of the two students
filed a complaint claiming the schools’ regulation violated the First Amendment.73
Emphasizing that there was no evidence that the schools’ regulation was necessary to
avoid a material and substantial interference with school work or discipline,74 the
Court concluded that the regulation violated the students’ constitutional rights to free
speech under the First Amendment.75 The Court also acknowledged that “First
Amendment rights, applied in light of the special characteristics of the school
environment, are available to teachers and students.”76
2. The Hazelwood Case
Almost twenty years after Tinker, the Supreme Court once again examined the
First Amendment protections of students’ speech in Hazelwood.77 The dispute in
Hazelwood arose when school officials for Hazelwood East High School deleted two
articles from the student-run school newspaper.78 Three former staff members of the

69

Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969); see also Emily
Gold Waldman, Returning to Hazelwood’s Core: A New Approach to Restrictions on SchoolSponsored Speech, 60 FLA. L. REV. 63, 70 (2008) (explaining that the Supreme Court in
Hazelwood relied on Tinker to reach their decision).
70

Tinker, 393 U.S. at 506.

71

Id. at 504.

72

Id.

73

Id. at 504-05.

74

Id. at 509-10.

75

Id. at 514.

76

Id. at 506 (second emphasis added).

77

Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260 (1988).

78

Id. at 262. One article, which discussed students’ experience with pregnancy, was
removed to keep the identity of the pregnant girls a secret; in addition, the references to sexual
activity and birth control were deemed inappropriate for the younger students. Id. at 263. The
other article, which discussed the impact of divorce and included many quotes from students
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newspaper brought suit claiming that removal of the articles constituted a violation
of the First Amendment.79 At the start of the opinion, the Court famously
acknowledged that “[s]tudents in the public schools do not ‘shed their constitutional
rights to freedom of speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate.’”80 The Court
held that because the newspaper was not a forum for public expression, the school
officials were entitled to regulate the paper’s contents in any “reasonable” manner.81
The Court also set up the framework for the Hazelwood test by holding that
educators do not offend the First Amendment by exercising editorial control over the
style and content of school sponsored speech, so long as regulations reasonably
relate to legitimate pedagogical concerns.82
3. Hazelwood Test and Application to Teachers’ Instructional Speech
Even though Hazelwood involved students’ speech, it has also been extended to
teachers’ instructional speech. In circuits that use the Hazelwood test,83 a regulation
of teachers’ in-class speech is valid only when the regulation reasonably relates to
legitimate pedagogical concerns.84
The Tenth Circuit was the first court to apply Hazelwood to a public school
teacher by upholding the actions of school authorities in forbidding a fifth grade
teacher from keeping two religious books in his classroom and reading the Bible
during silent reading time.85 Interestingly enough, the court extended Hazelwood to
create a new standard for teachers’ speech without reasoning, analysis, or
precedent.86 One year later, the Tenth Circuit relied on Hazelwood again to hold that
a high school teacher had no First Amendment claim for comments that he made in
class concerning a widely known rumor that two students had sex on the school’s
tennis courts.87 The Tenth Circuit found “no reason to distinguish between the
classroom discussion of students and teachers in applying Hazelwood here. A
school’s interests in regulating classroom speech . . . are implicated regardless of
concerning their parents, was removed because the principal believed that the parents should
have an opportunity to respond or consent to the publication. Id.
79

Id. at 262.

80

Id. at 266 (quoting Tinker, 393 U.S. at 506).

81

Id. at 270.

82

Id. at 273.

83

See supra note 65.

84

Kuhn, supra note 63, at 1010.

85

Roberts v. Madigan, 921 F.2d 1047, 1049 (10th Cir. 1990); see also Kuhn, supra note
63, at 1010.
86

Kuhn, supra note 63, at 1020 (“Indeed, the first court to apply the Hazelwood standard
to teachers engaged in only the most cursory analysis, and failed to cite any First Amendment
precedent involving teachers. Creating a new standard out of a case with dissimilar facts
should be done with careful explanation and thoughtful analysis of the connections between
the different contexts, but instead, the predominant test for deciding instructional speech cases
was tailored in response to student speech concerns and applied to teachers with little regard
for the consequences.” (footnote omitted)).
87

Miles v. Denver Pub. Sch., 944 F.2d 773, 774 (10th Cir. 1991).
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whether that speech comes from a teacher or student.”88 Subsequently, many circuits
followed the Tenth Circuit in applying the Hazelwood test to teachers’ instructional
speech.89 The circuits that do not use the Hazelwood test90 primarily rely on the
Pickering test.
B. The Pickering Test
Whereas the Hazelwood test derives from student speech, the Pickering test
focuses on the speech of teachers as public employees.91 In Pickering, the Supreme
Court created a test to protect teachers’ speech made outside of classroom,92 and
fifteen years later in Connick v. Myers,93 the Court modified Pickering into a twostep analysis for all public employee speech.94
1. The Pickering Case
In Pickering, a public school teacher was dismissed after writing a letter that
attacked the school board’s handling of financial resources to the editor of the local
newspaper.95 The teacher brought suit claiming that his letter was protected by the
First Amendment.96 The Court began its analysis by noting the difficulty in finding
“a balance between the interests of the teacher, as a citizen, in commenting upon
matters of public concern and the interest of the state, as an employer, in promoting
the efficiency of the public services it performs through its employees.”97 The Court
reasoned that the teacher’s comments were shown not to impede the performance of
the teacher’s duties in the classroom nor to interfere with the operation of the
school.98 Because the school board’s interest in limiting the teacher’s opportunity to
contribute to the matter of public concern was not significantly greater than the
board’s interest in limiting a similar contribution by any other member of the general
public, the teacher’s letter was protected by the First Amendment.99

88

Waldman, supra note 69, at 80 (quoting Miles, 944 F.2d at 777).

89

See supra note 65.

90

Id.

91

Kuhn, supra note 63, at 1001-02.

92

Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 574 (1968).

93

Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138 (1983).

94

Elizabeth Dale, Employee Speech & Management Rights: A Counterintuitive Reading of
Garcetti v. Ceballos, 29 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 175, 182 (2008).
95

Pickering, 391 U.S. at 566.

96

Id. at 567.

97

Id. at 568.

98

Id. at 572-73.

99

Id. at 573.
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2. Connick: Refining the Pickering Test
Fifteen years after Pickering, the Supreme Court again balanced the interests of
an employee as a citizen and the state as an employer.100 In Connick v. Myers, the
district attorney’s office terminated an assistant to the district attorney after the
assistant distributed a questionnaire to solicit the views of other employees regarding
the office transfer policy.101 The employee brought suit, claiming that her
termination was wrongful as it violated her First Amendment right to free speech.102
The Court held that the employee’s limited First Amendment interest did not require
the employer to tolerate the employee’s actions because the employer reasonably
believed the actions would disrupt the office, undermine authority, and destroy the
close relationships within the office.103 The Connick decision increased attention to
public employer interests and also turned the flexibility of Pickering into a rigid,
two-step test.104
3. Pickering Test and Application to Teachers’ Instructional Speech
The Pickering test, also known as the balancing test, consists of a two-step
analysis.105 First, the court must decide whether the speech involves a matter of
public concern,106 which must be determined by the content, form, and context of the
speech in question.107 If the matter does not touch on a matter of public concern,
then the First Amendment inquiry stops because the speech is not constitutionally
protected.108 When the speech does touch on a matter of public concern, the court
must then weigh the teachers’ interest in expression against the government’s interest
in workplace efficiency and avoidance of disruption.109 The focus of this test is
100

Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 142 (1983).

101

Id. at 140-42.

102

Id. at 141.

103

Id. at 154.

104

Dale, supra note 94, at 182-83.

105

Cal. Teachers Ass’n v. State Bd. of Educ., 271 F.3d 1141, 1149 n.6 (9th Cir. 2001);
Daly, supra note 60, at 17; Kuhn, supra note 63, at 1001-02; see also Mitchell J. Michalec,
The Classified Information Protection Act, Killing the Messenger or Killing the Message, 50
CLEV. ST. L. REV. 455, 460-61 (2002).
106

Cal. Teachers Ass’n, 271 F.3d at 1149 n.6; Daly, supra note 60, at 17; Kuhn, supra
note 63, at 1001-02.
107
Connick, 461 U.S. at 147-48. As to content of the speech, matters that relate to
“‘political, social, or other concern to the community,’ as opposed to matters ‘only of personal
interest,’” are usually held to be matters of public concern. Evans-Marshall v. Bd. of Educ.,
428 F.3d 223, 229 (6th Cir. 2005) (quoting Cockrel v. Shelby County Sch. Dist., 270 F.3d
1036, 1052 (6th Cir. 2001)). The Fifth Circuit has also noted that “issues do not rise to a level
of ‘public concern’ [merely] by virtue of the speaker’s interest in the subject matter.”
Kirkland v. Northside Indep. Sch. Dist., 890 F.2d 794, 798 (5th Cir. 1989).
108

Connick, 461 U.S. at 147.

109

Cal. Teachers Ass’n, 271 F.3d at 1149 n.6 (citing Brewster v. Bd. of Educ., 149 F.3d
971, 978 (9th Cir. 1998)).
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more on the nature of the teachers’ speech,110 whereas the Hazelwood test focuses on
the reasonableness of the administration in regulating the speech.111
Although Pickering was developed in the context of a teacher’s out-of-class
speech and Connick was developed in the public employer’s setting, the test has,
nonetheless, been extended to teachers’ in-class speech. The Fifth Circuit first
applied the Pickering test in Kirkland v. Northside Independent School District,
when a teacher claimed he had been dismissed for using an unapproved reading
list.112 Although the Court mentioned Hazelwood, the Court applied Pickering by
holding that the teacher’s use of an unapproved reading list did not rise to the level
of public concern.113 Even though other circuits have followed the Fifth Circuit in
applying Pickering to teachers’ classroom speech,114 the Fourth Circuit was the only
court to explain its reasoning for using Pickering rather than Hazelwood by
clarifying that with teachers’ instructional speech: “This is not a case concerning
pupil speech, as in Hazelwood, either classroom or otherwise. This case concerns
itself exclusively with employee speech, as does Connick [and Pickering].”115
Despite extending Pickering to teachers’ classroom speech, a recent change to the
test has created another split among courts already applying Pickering.
4. Garcetti: Creating a Split Among the Split
In 2006, the Supreme Court refined the Pickering analysis once again by
examining whether or not a government employee’s speech is protected by the First
Amendment when made pursuant to the employee’s official duties.116 In Garcetti v.
Ceballos, a calendar deputy employed by the county district attorney’s office
discovered that an affidavit used to secure a search warrant contained serious
misrepresentations, and the deputy wrote a disposition memorandum to one of his
supervisors recommending dismissal of the case.117 After allegedly being subjected
to a series of retaliatory employment actions as a result of the memorandum, the
deputy brought suit claiming that his supervisors’ alleged retaliation violated his
First Amendment rights.118 The Court explained that while employees who make
public statements outside the course of performing their official duties retain some
possibility of First Amendment protection, when a public employee speaks within
his or her official employment duties, “there is no relevant analogue to speech by
citizens who are not government employees.”119 Ultimately, the Court held that the

110

Daly, supra note 60, at 17.

111

Id.

112

Kirkland, 890 F.2d at 795-96.

113

Id. at 800-01.

114

See supra note 65.

115

Boring v. Buncombe County Bd. of Educ., 136 F.3d 364, 371 n.2 (4th Cir. 1998).

116

Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 413 (2006).

117

Id. at 413-14.

118

Id. at 415.

119

Id. at 423-24.
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First Amendment does not prohibit an employer’s discipline based on an employee’s
expressions made pursuant to official duties and responsibilities.120
Currently, only two Circuits have addressed whether or not Garcetti applies to
teachers’ instructional speech,121 and each has reached different conclusions.122 The
Fourth Circuit determined that the court should continue to apply the traditional
Pickering test because the Supreme Court did not explicitly extend Garcetti to
teachers.123 The Seventh Circuit, however, determined that Garcetti applies to
teachers’ instructional speech and that the First Amendment does not entitle teachers
to speak outside of the curriculum adopted by the school system.124 Under the
Garcetti test, the Seventh Circuit noted that because school systems pay teachers’
salaries, school systems could, therefore, regulate the speech.125 The principles
underlying Garcetti reflect the same underlying principles of the Rust test, namely
that teachers in the classroom have no First Amendment protections.
C. The Rust Test
Instead of looking at teachers’ speech in the context of public employees as the
Pickering test does, the Rust test examines teachers’ speech in the context of
government speech.126 Originally created for abortion-related speech made by
doctors using government funds to provide family-funding services,127 the Rust test
has been used to prohibit First Amendment claims in the arts128 and public
libraries.129
1. Rust v. Sullivan: Government Speech
In 1970, Congress passed Title X, under which federal funds would be provided
for family-funding services.130 In an attempt to ensure that the funds were used for
Congress’s intended purposes,131 the Act specified that Title X funds could not be
120

Id. at 424.

121

Evans-Marshall v. Bd. of Educ., No. 3:03CV091, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 58202, at *26
(S.D. Ohio July 30, 2008); Mayer v. Monroe County Cmty. Sch. Corp., 474 F.3d 477, 480 (7th
Cir. 2007); Lee v. York County Sch. Div., 484 F.3d 687, 694 (4th Cir. 2007).
122
Evans-Marshall, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 58202, at *26; Mayer, 474 F.3d at 477; Lee,
484 F.3d at 687.
123

Evans-Marshall, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 58202, at *26-27; Lee, 484 F.3d at 695.

124

Evans-Marshall, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 58202, at *26; Mayer, 474 F.3d at 480.

125

Mayer, 474 F.3d at 479; Dale, supra note 94, at 201.

126

See Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173 (1991).

127

Id.

128

Nat’l Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569 (1998).

129

United States v. Am. Library Ass’n, 539 U.S. 194 (2003).

130

Rust, 500 U.S. at 178.

131

Id. at 178-79 (explaining that the funds were intended “to support preventive family
planning services, population research, infertility services, and other related medical,
informational, and education activities” (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 91-1667, at 8 (1970) (Conf.
Rep.))).
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used to provide abortion counseling as a family planning method; Title X projects
could not encourage or promote abortion as a family method; and Title X projects
had to be organized so that they were financially and physically separated from
abortion activities.132 Several Title X grantees and doctors brought suit, claiming
that the abortion related regulations violated the First Amendment rights of the
clients and healthcare providers.133 The Court noted that when the government funds
a program, it is entitled to both define the limits of the program134 and insist that
those “public funds be spent for the purposes for which they were authorized.”135 The
Court ultimately held that the regulations did not violate the First Amendment
because the regulations did not force the employees to give up abortion related
speech, and the regulations merely required that abortion activities be kept distinct
from the activities of the Title X project, which the employees were voluntarily
employed to do.136
2. Rust Line of Precedent
Over the past twenty years, the Supreme Court has expanded Rust’s reach. One
of the most notable cases where Rust was applied is Rosenberger v. Rector &
Visitors of the University of Virginia,137 in which students from the University of
Virginia brought suit claiming a First Amendment violation when university
guidelines prohibited the allocation of student funds for religious activities.138 The
Court extensively quoted Rust and noted that when the government appropriates
public funds to promote a particular message, it is entitled to take legitimate and
reasonable steps to ensure the message is not distorted.139 Although the Rust holding
ultimately was not extended to the facts of the case, as the funds in question were
student funds and not government funds,140 the case is still commonly cited to for its
approving analysis of Rust.141

132

Id. at 179-80.

133
Id. at 181. The specific issue before the Court was whether the regulations violated the
First Amendment by impermissibly discriminating on viewpoint because the regulations
prohibited all speech concerning abortion as a lawful option. Id. at 182.
134

Id. at 194.

135

Id. at 196.

136

Id. at 198-99.

137

Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819 (1995).

138

Id. at 827. Specifically, the guidelines stated that Student Activity Funds could not be
used to support the following: “religious activities, philanthropic contributions and activities,
political activities, activities that would jeopardize the University’s tax-exempt status, those
which involve payment of honoraria or similar fees, or social entertainment or related
expenses.” Id. at 825. The students who brought suit were in charge of a Christian newspaper
and claimed the school’s failure to authorize printing costs for the religious newspaper
violated the First Amendment. Id. at 827.
139

Id. at 833 (citing Rust, 500 U.S. at 194, 196-200).

140

Id. at 834, 836.

141

See generally Edwards v. Cal. Univ. of Pa., 156 F.3d 488, 491 (3d Cir. 1998).
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Three years after Rosenberger, the Supreme Court expanded Rust’s holding to
reach the arts. In National Endowment of the Arts v. Finley,142 Congress allocated
subsidies to fund the arts, and with these funds, Congress imposed certain criteria
restricting the type of art the funds could be used to create.143 Relying on Rust, the
Court held that because Congress funded the art projects, Congress’s determination
to favor certain beliefs expressed, through funding restrictions, did not infringe on
anyone’s freedom of speech.144 Five years after Finley,145 the Court again applied
Rust in United States v. American Library Ass’n146 to hold that government
restrictions, which forbade public libraries from receiving federal funding for
internet access unless the libraries installed a filter software on the internet, did not
violate library patrons’ First Amendment rights.147 Even though the majority
recognized that public libraries provide internet access to encourage diversity and to
facilitate research and learning,148 the Court, nonetheless, found that the government
could impose restrictions because it was merely insisting that “funds be spent for the
purposes for which they were authorized.”149 The Rust line of precedent stands for
the proposition that by restricting government-funded speech, “the [g]overnment is
142

Nat’l Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569 (1998).

143

Id. at 575. After the subsidies were used for what Congress described as obscene and
pornographic art, Congress imposed the restrictions on the art. The restrictions stated that the
funds may not be used to:
[P]romote, disseminate, or produce materials which in the judgment of [the NEA] may
be considered obscene, including but not limited to, depictions of sadomasochism,
homoeroticism, the sexual exploitation of children, or individuals engaged in sex acts
and which, when taken as a whole, do not have serious literary, artistic, political, or
scientific value.
Id. (quoting Department of the Interior and Related Agencies Appropriations Act of 1990,
Pub. L. 101-121, 103 Stat. 701, 741 (1989)).
144

Id. at 587-88.

145

It is important to note that three years after Finley and two years before American
Library Ass’n, the Court appeared to curtail Rust’s reach in Legal Services Corp. v. Velazquez,
531 U.S. 533 (2001). Under the Legal Services Corporation Act, Congress appropriated funds
to local organizations for the purpose of providing legal assistance to indigent clients. Id. at
536. Congress imposed a restriction that prohibited LSC lawyers from providing legal
representation with LSC funds if the representation involved an effort to change existing
welfare law. Id. at 536-37. Lawyers employed by the LSC grant brought suit claiming the
restrictions violated the First Amendment. Id. Noting that “an LSC-funded attorney speaks
on behalf of the client in a claim against the government for welfare benefits,” the Court found
that Rust was not applicable because the government program in question was not intended to
promote a government message but to promote private speech. Id. at 542-43. Although
Velazquez is important for its discussion of Rust and Rosenberger, this decision does not stand
in the way of applying Rust to instructional speech, because in Velazquez, the very essence of
the program required that the government not be the speaker, which is not the case in public
education.
146

United States v. Am. Library Ass’n, 539 U.S. 194 (2003).

147

Id.

148

Id. at 206-07.

149

Id. at 211-12 (quoting Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 196 (1991)).
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not denying a benefit to anyone, but is instead simply insisting that public funds be
spent for the purposes for which they were authorized.”150 As the Supreme Court has
gradually and continually expanded the Rust reasoning to the arts and public
libraries, at least one lower court has extended Rust to teachers’ speech in the
classroom.151
3. Rust Test and Application to Teachers’ Instructional Speech
Under the test developed by the Court in Rust, “when the government is the
speaker, in the sense that the government is conveying a particular message through
a person, that person receives no First Amendment protection.”152
The Third Circuit is the only circuit to apply this test to teachers’ instructional
speech and has only done so in the university setting.153 In Edwards v. California
University of Pennsylvania, quoting Rosenberger, the Third Circuit stated the
following: “When the University determines the content of the education it provides,
it is the University speaking, and we have permitted the government to regulate the
content of what is or is not expressed when it is the speaker or when it enlists private
entities to convey its own message.”154 Applying Rust and Rosenberger, the Third
Circuit held “that a public university professor does not have a First Amendment
right to decide what will be taught in the classroom.”155 Since the Third Circuit
applied the Rust test in Edwards, it has been extended to other cases involving
teachers’ curricular speech.156 Despite the original application to a university setting,
it is well accepted that K-12 teachers should receive less First Amendment protection
than university professors.157 Edwards and Rust, at the very least, show the ceiling
rather than the floor for teachers’ First Amendment protections.
The Rust test is ideal for teachers’ instructional speech as the state and local
governments, through their curriculums, are conveying a particular message. The
state and local governments should be able to ensure that their message is not
distorted, and therefore, teachers should have no First Amendment right to speak
outside of the prescribed curriculum.158 Because “school system[s] [do] not
‘regulate’ teachers’ speech as much as it hires that speech,”159 the power to control

150

Rust, 500 U.S. at 196.

151

Edwards v. Cal. Univ. of Pa., 156 F. 3d 488 (3d Cir. 1998).

152

Cal. Teachers Ass’n v. Bd. of Educ., 271 F.3d 1141, 1149 n.6 (9th Cir. 2001).

153

Edwards, 156 F. 3d at 488.

154

Id. at 491-92.

155

Id. at 491.

156
See Brown v. Armenti, 247 F.3d 69 (3d Cir. 2001) (holding that a university professor
did not have a First Amendment right to expression via the school’s grade assignment
procedures).
157

See infra text accompanying notes 202-13.

158

See Mayer v. Monroe County Cmty. Sch. Corp., 474 F.3d 477, 479 (7th Cir. 2007).

159

Mayer, 474 F.3d at 479.
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the subjects and viewpoints that are being expressed in the classroom should rest
with state and local governments, not teachers.160
IV. TESTS APPLIED: WHY COURTS SHOULD RELY ON RUST FOR TEACHERS’
INSTRUCTIONAL SPEECH
The current split that exists in the circuits regarding which of the three available
tests to apply can be difficult to analyze, especially in light of the fact that even the
courts themselves have not examined the advantages or disadvantages of using one
test over the other.161 Further confusion arises when the courts combine the tests or
apply variations of a test.162 This section examines the reasons for and against using
the Hazelwood and Pickering tests and shows why Rust and its line of precedent best
protect the core interests of public schools.
A. Analysis of the Hazelwood Test
The Hazelwood test is used by an overwhelming majority of the courts163 mainly
because, of the three tests, Hazelwood is the only one that was created in a school
environment.164 The Hazelwood test focuses on the interests of the state as an
educator, and thus it is more tailored to the school environment than the Pickering
test, which focuses on the state as an employer, or the Rust test, which focuses on the
state as the speaker.165 By focusing on the state as an educator, the Hazelwood test
ensures that teachers’ speech is not mistakenly attributed to the views of the school
by making certain that students learn mandated curriculum without being exposed to
unsuitable material.166 The Court in Hazelwood emphasized that a school does not
have to tolerate student speech when other students, parents, and members of the
public may reasonably perceive the speech in question to bear the imprimatur of the
school.167 As such, the extension of Hazelwood to teachers seems appropriate
because speech by teachers may reasonably be perceived to bear the imprimatur of
the school more than student speech.168 This logic, however, does not take into
consideration the fact that nothing in the Hazelwood opinion shows an intent to apply
the same standards equally to students and teachers.169

160

Id. at 479-80.

161

Daly, supra note 60, at 17.

162

Id. This is especially true for the Hazelwood and Pickering tests, which inherently,
leave a lot of room for inconsistent application. See infra text accompanying notes 175-84,
190-98.
163

See supra note 65.

164

Kuhn, supra note 63, at 1014.

165

Id.

166

Id.

167

Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 271 (1988).

168

Daly, supra note 60, at 14.

169

Id. at 12. One commentator described this over-extension of Hazelwood as “[t]rying to
fit the square peg of a teacher’s in class speech into the round hole of Hazelwood” and by
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Under the Hazelwood test, courts routinely find that there is no First Amendment
protection of teachers’ speech when a public school reasonably believes that the
speech would undermine pedagogical concerns.170 In that sense, the Hazelwood test
is analogous to the rational basis test, in that so long as there is some rational basis
between regulating the teachers’ speech and a legitimate pedagogical concern, the
regulation will be upheld.171 Even though teachers have the burden of persuasion in
Hazelwood cases, because of this broad definition of “reasonably related to
pedagogical concerns,” school boards are more successful than teachers.172 While
the Hazelwood test is less protective of an individual’s speech,173 the test prevents
individual judges from intruding on the school board’s authority, as courts rarely find
a government action unconstitutional under such standard.174
Despite the seemingly predictable nature of Hazelwood, a common problem of
the test’s application is the definition of “pedagogical.”175 Some courts have adopted
a very broad definition of “pedagogical,” under which schools have unlimited
authority to regulate teachers’ speech, sometimes without even showing that the
restriction relates to a legitimate pedagogical concern.176 Alternatively, other courts
have no definition of pedagogical, and instead determine the definition on a case by

doing so, courts “distort[ed] Hazelwood itself, undermining its utility in the student speech
context for which it was actually designed.” Waldman, supra note 69, at 108.
170
Kuhn, supra note 63, at 1017; see also Elizabeth Decoux, Does Congress Find Facts or
Construct Them? The Ascendance of Politics Over Reliability, Perfected in Gonzales v.
Carhart, 56 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 319, 366 (2008) (explaining that the rational basis test leads to
the regulation being upheld, whereas “when the rational basis is not the test, legislatures tend
to fair poorly”).
171

It is important to note that because of the rational basis-type analysis under Hazelwood,
the outcome of Hazelwood cases and Rust cases will almost always be the same. The
difference is the way of reaching the outcome. Under the Hazelwood test, the school board
must make a showing of a reasonable relation to pedagogical concerns. Kuhn, supra note 63,
at 1010. Also, as discussed below, other problems could arise under Hazelwood, thus making
it unpredictable and inconsistent. See infra text accompanying notes 175-84.
172

Jason R. Wiener, Note, The Right to Teach, the Right to Speak, and the Right to be a
Valuable Contributor to a Child’s Upbringing: Public School Teachers’ First Amendment
Right to Free Speech and Expression, 32 W. ST. U. L. REV. 105, 117-18 (2004).
173

Heather M. Good, Comment, “The Forgotten Child of our Constitution”: The Parental
Free Exercise Right to Direct the Education and Religious Upbringing of Children, 54 EMORY
L.J. 641, 645 (2005) (explaining that rational basis type scrutiny “is less protective of
individual rights and liberties”).
174

Id.

175

Kuhn, supra note 63, at 1017-19 (describing various pedagogical concerns).

176

Id. at 1018. The Fourth Circuit held that anything educational is pedagogical, thus
including all speech relating to the curriculum. Boring v. Buncombe County Bd. of Educ.,
136 F.3d 364 (4th Cir. 1998). The Sixth Circuit expanded the definition even more by finding
that “legitimate pedagogical concerns is by no means confined to the academic.” Poling v.
Murphy, 872 F.2d 757, 762 (6th Cir. 1989). These broad definitions of pedagogical show a
moving trend towards the justifications underlying Rust in that public schools can regulate
teachers’ instructional speech.
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case basis.177 This “undefined nature of ‘legitimate pedagogical concerns,’ coupled
with judicial deference to the judgment of school officials, creates the potential for
abuse,”178 as well as inconsistency.
Another problem under Hazelwood deals with the requirement of notice, as set
forth in the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.179 A notice
requirement is constitutionally fulfilled when it adequately informs the average
teacher of what kind of speech is prohibited.180 Although some courts have outright
rejected a notice requirement,181 the plurality of courts do call for notice.182 Some
courts that have a notice requirement create leeway for the schools by not mandating
that there be an express prohibition of every imaginable speech, but rather, that there
only be policies and regulations in place to give teachers a reasonable expectation of
prohibited speech.183 Other courts, however, simply weigh adequate notice as a
factor in the determination of reasonableness of the regulation.184 These different
requirements for notice, as well as the undefined nature of pedagogical concerns,
have led to unpredictability and inconsistency among the courts applying
Hazelwood.
B. Analysis of the Pickering Test
Whereas under the Hazelwood test the government regulations are rarely struck
down, in Pickering cases, speech involving public concern is rarely found to cause
work interferences.185 As a result, unless special circumstances exist, such as the
need for confidentiality or special obligations, the teachers’ speech is usually
protected by the First Amendment.186
177

Ward v. Hickey, 996 F.2d 448, 454 (1st Cir. 1993).

178

Daly, supra note 60, at 13.

179

Kuhn, supra note 63, at 1012-13.

180

Id.

181

Boring, 136 F.3d at 364.

182
Daly, supra note 60, at 23 (explaining that the First, Second, and Eighth Circuits have
some type of notice requirement). When the courts find that there is inadequate notice, the
regulation will be unconstitutional on vagueness grounds. Kuhn, supra note 63, at 1012.
183

Daly, supra note 60, at 23 (citing Ward v. Hickey, 996 F.2d 448, 454 (1st Cir. 1993)).

184

Id. (citing Webster v. New Lenox Sch. Dist. No. 122, 917 F.2d 1004 (7th Cir. 1990);
Kirkland v. Northside Indep. Sch. Dist., 890 F.2d 794, 796 (5th Cir. 1989)).
185
Kuhn, supra note 63, at 1007; see also William P. Barnette, The Run for the Roses
Meets the First Amendment: An Examination of Desormeaux v. Kentucky Racing Commission
and the Constitutionality of Prohibitions on Jockey Advertising, 52 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 371, 379
(2004).
186

Id. at 1007-08. As Justice White noted in his opinion in Pickering:
The State may not fire the teacher for making [false statements on a matter of public
concern] unless, as I gather it, there are special circumstances, not present in this case,
demonstrating an overriding state interest, such as the need for confidentiality or the
special obligations which a teacher in a particular position may owe to his superiors.
Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 582 (1968) (White, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
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Under the Pickering test, courts recognize that the essence of the relationship
between teachers and schools is that of employer-employee.187 When teachers speak,
they are doing what they were hired and paid to do, which is why courts use the
Pickering test for in-class speech.188 The underlying rationale for extending
Pickering to this context is that teachers, as public employees, should not give up
their right to speak on matters of public concern solely because of the fact that they
are public employees.189
Despite accounting for the employer-employee relationship of teachers and
schools, a common criticism of the Pickering test is that the “public concern”
standard is not tailored for instructional speech.190 Because “the essence of a
teacher’s role in the classroom, and therefore as an employee, is to discuss with
students issues of public concern,”191 the Pickering test fails to account for the
unique environment of public school teachers.192 For example, under the Pickering
test, the right to speak outside of the curriculum is non-existent for some teachers,
such as math teachers, while other teachers, such as social studies or literature
teachers, regularly touch on matters of public concern.193 Because of this, some
teachers enjoy protection on most of their speech, as they can claim their speech
touched on matters of public concern, while other teachers receive no protection.194
Further inconsistencies are present with the “public concern” standard, as courts
have the authority to determine “public concern” by focusing on the role of the
speaker or the context, form, and content of the speech in question.195 Because it is
“within a court’s discretion to choose which of these factors to focus on most
heavily,”196 there is no uniformity among the courts when determining matters of
public concern.197
The test is also ill-suited for instructional speech because the speech in Pickering
was created by examining speech spoken outside of the classroom. Instructional
speech, however, is spoken inside the classroom. The Pickering test, “designed and
developed to address one paradigm of expression, cannot be stretched in an
intellectually honest manner to cover in-class speech, no matter how deserving of

187

Waldman, supra note 69, at 102.

188

Id.

189

Kuhn, supra note 63, at 1002.

190

Id. at 1008-09.

191

Waldman, supra note 69, at 103 (quoting Boring v. Buncombe County Bd. of Educ., 98
F.3d 1474, 1479-80 (4th Cir. 1996)).
192

Id.

193

Vikram Amar & Alan Brownstein, Academic Freedom, 9 GREEN BAG 2d 17, 19 (2005).

194

Id.

195

Emily Holes Davis, Note & Recent Development, Protecting the “Marketplace of
Ideas”: The First Amendment and Public School Teachers’ Classroom Speech, 3 FIRST
AMEND. L. REV. 335, 361-62 (2005).
196

Id. at 361.

197

Id. at 361-63.
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constructional protection.”198 As instructional speech is made pursuant to teachers’
job descriptions, Pickering, standing alone, is not applicable; however, the changes
Garcetti made to the traditional Pickering test are applicable to teachers’
instructional speech.
Garcetti was important not only for the change it made to the Pickering test, but
also for affirming the relevance of Rust by concluding that the “public has the right
to expect its government to work towards ends that have been ‘democratically agreed
upon.’”199 This analogy can be easily extended to public schools because when
teachers are speaking as the government, the public has the right to expect that
teachers will instruct according to what the state and local governments have agreed
upon. The analysis under Garcetti is more straightforward than both Pickering and
Hazelwood because this test contains a “per se rule categorizing official duty speech
as government expression.”200 Furthermore, the application of the Garcetti test and
the Rust test are very similar in that, with public employee speech (Garcetti) and
governmental speech (Rust), the government has in a sense purchased, through salary
or funding, the speech, and therefore, has a right to regulate the content of that
speech.201
Whether the Garcetti test or Rust test is applied to teachers’ instructional speech,
the outcome is the same in that the teachers have no First Amendment protection.
Rust, however, is more applicable to instructional speech as teachers’ speech in the
classroom is that of the government and not of public employees.
C. Extending Rust to Teachers’ Instructional Speech
Courts may hesitate to extend Rust to teachers’ instructional speech because the
dicta in Rust expressed reservations about broadening Rust’s reach to universities;
therefore, by showing that K-12 schools are too dissimilar to universities, the Rust
dicta presents no problem in extending Rust to public schools. Second, by showing
that instructional speech is really government speech, the necessary foundation will
be laid to then show that the government has First Amendment protections of
instructional speech, not teachers. Although there are some problems legally and
realistically with the Rust test, the underlying rationale of Rust, as well as policy
concerns, support Rust’s application over the Hazelwood and Pickering tests.

198

Daly, supra note 60, at 11.

199
Andrew Bernie, Recent Development, A Principled Limitation on Judicial Inference:
Garcetti v. Ceballos, 30 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 1047, 1056 (2003).
200

Nicole B. Cásarez, The Student Press, the Public Workplace, and Expanding Notions of
Government Speech, 35 J.C. & U.L. 1, 50 (2008). This per se rule in turn leads to judicial
economy. Id. For example, under the Hazelwood test there are requirements of a reasonable
relationship to pedagogical concerns. Id. Although this “reasonable relation” is not a hard
standard to meet, certain factors, such as notice, can lead to a lengthy analysis. See supra text
accompanying notes 175-84. The Garcetti test, however, does not even require a bare
reasonableness showing, and as such, the only showing necessary is that the speech is
instructional.
201

Donald J. Weidner, Thoughts on Academic Freedom: Urofksy and Beyond, 33 U. TOL.
L. REV. 257, 261 (2001).
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1. Rust Dicta: Universities vs. Public Schools
The majority in Rust had specific reservations about extending the decision to
public forums and public universities,202 and as a result, courts may be hesitant in
applying Rust to teachers’ instructional speech. Recognizing that a university is a
“traditional sphere of free expression so fundamental to the functioning of our
society,” the Rust majority reasoned that the government does not have free reign to
control speech merely because it subsidizes universities.203 Despite singling out
universities, the decision makes no reference to whether public schools are in a
traditional sphere of expression, and thus, exempt from Rust’s reach as well.204 “A
reasonable implication of this omission is that since public elementary and secondary
schools receive federal funding, the federal government may condition its grants on
content-based regulation of the messages purveyed by the schools.”205
The Supreme Court has traditionally viewed public universities and public
schools as being so “fundamentally different from each other”206 that there is no
reason to believe that the Court would refrain from applying Rust to public schools.
Established precedent recognizes that state legislatures have the “undoubted right to
prescribe the curriculum for its public schools,”207 whereas the Court has never held
that legislatures have that same right as to universities.208 Not only do universities
and public schools differ in the amount of control the government exerts on the
curriculum, but the purposes and functions of universities209 are significantly
different from the purposes and functions of public schools.210
202

Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 199-200 (1991).

203

Id.
Similarly, we have recognized that the university is a traditional sphere of free
expression so fundamental to the functioning of our society that the Government’s
ability to control speech within that sphere by means of conditions attached to the
expenditure of Government funds is restricted by the vagueness and overbreadth
doctrines of the First Amendment.
Id. at 200 (citation omitted).
204
See Danielle E. Caminiti, Comment, Brooklyn Institute of Arts & Sciences v. City of
New York: The Death of the Subsidy and the Birth of the Entitlement in Funding of the Arts,
10 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 875, 896 (2000) (noting that “[t]he decision in
Rust notably made no reference to museums or public elementary and secondary schools”).
205

Susan H. Bitensky, A Contemporary Proposal for Reconciling the Free Speech Clause
with Curricular Values Inculcation in the Public Schools, 70 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 769, 822
n.282 (1995).
206
Laura A. Jeltema, Comment, Legislators in the Classroom: Why State Legislatures
Cannot Decide Higher Education Curricula, 54 AM. U.L. REV. 215, 229 (2004).
207

Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 107 (1968).

208

Jeltema, supra note 206, at 229.

209
Id. at 227-31. The underlying purposes of universities are to “expose students to new
ideas and to allow for the critical questioning of these ideas,” as well as encourage diversity in
education. Id. at 230. Although there are limitations on what can be taught to K-12 students, as
prescribed through the legislature, universities “are free to offer religious, theological, or
political courses.” Id. at 231. Most importantly, “educational experts maintain that the
curricular inclusion of controversial issues and experience with diversity [in the university
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The differences between university professors and K-12 teachers further illustrate
differences between the two educational spheres. Whereas parents and students
depend on teachers to follow the curriculum designed by the local governments,
professors in universities have more autonomy in choosing teaching and research
topics, and as such, professors have stronger First Amendment protections.211
Furthermore, because of a higher level of student maturity in universities, the need to
protect students from controversial or insensitive methods diminishes.212 Professors
in universities have more flexibility and authority than public teachers; therefore,
whatever constitutional principles govern professors do not apply to K-12 teachers.213
The aspects of universities that the majority in Rust was trying to preserve by
shielding universities from the holding are not applicable to public schools;
therefore, the dicta in Rust presents no problem for applying the Rust test to
situations involving public schools.
2. The Government is the Speaker in Public Schools
Teachers’ speech inside the classroom is government speech;214 therefore, the
government may take legitimate steps to ensure that the messages are not distorted.215
Determining to whom a speech belongs to is “admittedly . . . difficult once we
recognize that the state cannot literally speak, but can speak only through the voices
of others, others who have their own First Amendment rights in many other

setting] promotes the development of necessary life skills.” Id. at 230-31. Students in
universities also have total autonomy in choosing which school to enroll in, what classes to
take, and which professors to select; in addition, whether or not to pursue higher education in
the first place is a matter of choice. Id. at 230.
210
Id. at 230. The purposes and functions of K-12 schools are to prepare “individuals for
participation as citizens,” and as such, states have an interest in ensuring that certain values are
included in the curriculum, an interest that is not present in universities. Id; see also Nathaniel
J. McDonald, Note, Ohio Charter Schools and Educational Privatization: Undermining the
Legacy of the State Constitution’s Common School Approach, 53 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 467, 5000
(2005). Also, “[w]hile secondary schools are not rigid disciplinary institutions, neither are
they open forums in which mature adults, already habituated to social restraints, exchange
ideas on a level of parity.” W. Stuart Stuller, High School Academic Freedom: The Evolution
of a Fish Out of Water, 77 NEB. L. REV. 301, 335 (1998).
211

Jeltema, supra note 206, at 247.

212

Buss, supra note 58, at 274.

213

Id. at 277.

214

As states and local governments make decisions about the curriculum, “[t]he speech of
a public school teacher is unquestionably an exercise of state power.” Stuller, supra note 210,
at 332. For example, when teachers use the classroom to push religious beliefs, there will be a
violation of the Establishment Clause. Id.
215
Rosenberger v. Rectors & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 833 (1995); see
also Helen Norton, Not for Attribution: Government’s Interest in Protecting the Integrity of Its
Own Expression, 37 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1317, 1341 (2004) (noting that when the speech is
categorized as government speech, the First Amendment allows the government to protect and
control the speech).
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contexts.”216 Whether or not speech belongs to the government is something the
courts constantly wrestle over;217 however, the lower courts rely on four factors when
determining whether the speech belongs to the government: (1) who is the literal
speaker; (2) who exercises editorial control; (3) what is the purpose of the program;
and (4) whether the government or the private entity bears the ultimate
responsibility.218
It is not uncommon for the government to use a private speaker to bolster ideas,
issues, values, and subjects,219 and when doing so, “it should be permitted to decline
to serve as the ‘dummy’ through which a private ventriloquist projects her views.”220
When teachers speak in the classroom they appear to be literal speakers; however,
teachers are only acting as representatives of the school board and the state
legislatures.221 For example, one way the state may speak is by requiring teachers to
present only specified state viewpoints on social policy matters, and these
requirements that the state places on teachers are characterized as government
speech.222 Even though teachers physically speak in the classroom, the government
is the literal speaker.223
The government exercises editorial control over a certain program when the
speech goal is not to promote specific viewpoints, but rather to allow a limited,
government-approved range of viewpoints.224 In public education, someone must
control what ideas, issues, values, and subjects will be taught and what method or
materials will be used to convey those ideas, issues, values, and subjects.225 Not only
do most states statutorily express that the government is that someone,226 but as a
216
Frederick Schauer, Comment, Principles, Institutions, and the First Amendment, 112
HARV. L. REV. 84, 100 (1998).
217

Norton, supra note 215, at 1329 (“Determining whether certain expression belongs to
the government or to private speakers . . . can be tricky—so tough, in fact, that courts
wrestling with these questions have generated inconsistent and often unsatisfying opinions.”).
218
Caroline Mala Corbin, Mixed Speech: When Speech is both Private and Governmental,
83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 605, 627 n.118 (2008).
219

See Helen Norton, The Measure of Government Speech: Identifying Expression’s
Source, 88 B.U. L. REV. 587, 617 (2008).
220

Norton, supra note 215, at 1334.

221

Buss, supra note 58, at 256.

222

Schauer, supra note 216, at 101.

223

See Corbin, supra note 218, at 629-30.

224

Id. at 634-35.

225

Buss, supra note 58, at 241 (“What is taught at any level has to be based on some plan.
Education in the classroom, particularly over a semester or an extended period of time, cannot
simply be open-ended, allowing all ideas to come in at any time. Curriculum decisions entail
deciding which ideas, which issues, which subjects will be dealt with at what time. . . .
Someone must have an agenda; someone must have some control on relevance. Deciding
whether the teacher or the school board has control of the curriculum is deciding who gets to
make the determination of what agenda will be and through what materials and what method
the agenda will be pursued.”).
226

Stuller, supra note 210, at 333 (citing Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 104 (1968)).
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matter of public policy, the government should control public school curriculum.227
The limited range of approved viewpoints is prescribed by the government through
state legislatures and local governments in the form of the curriculum; therefore, the
local governments, not the teachers, exercise the editorial control.228
When determining the purpose of a program, the focus is “the speech goal of the
government program (if any) in which the speech appears.”229 Many purposes of
public education exist,230 and local governments set the curriculum in a manner that
will promote the purposes it wants to achieve. Although public education is
theoretically meant to be the “marketplace of ideas,”231 realistically the purpose of
public education is to ensure that students learn ideas, issues, values, and subjects
defined by the state.232 While the goals of public education may suggest teachers’
speech is actually mixed speech,233 the primary purpose of the speech in school is to
convey the government-approved curriculum.234
The government bears the ultimate responsibility financially and politically in
public education. As public education is wholly funded by the government, “it is a
logical default position that speech belongs to whoever pays for it.”235 The
government is responsible politically for the messages conveyed in the classroom.236
For example, not only can local officials be voted out of office, but parents and

227

Waldman, supra note 69, at 84 (citing Boring v. Bd. of Educ., 136 F.3d 364, 371 (4th
Cir. 1998) (en banc)).
228

See Corbin, supra note 218, at 633.

229

Id.

230

See supra note 210.

231

Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967).

232

Alexis Zouhary, Note, The Elephant in the Classroom: A Proposed Framework for
Applying Viewpoint Neutrality to Student Speech in the Secondary School Setting, 83 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 2227, 2254 (2008); see also infra notes 274-76 and accompanying text.
233

Corbin, supra note 218, at 634.
Under current free speech doctrine, speech made to advance a specific viewpoint (the
first possibility) is generally treated as government speech, while speech made in the
context of a government program to promote wide-ranging discussion (the second
possibility) is generally treated as private speech. It is the third possibility – speech
made within the context of a government program to promote only certain views – that
is the subject of considerable debate (and litigation). So while the first type points to
government speech and the second to private speech, the third, most contested,
suggests mixed speech.
Id. (citations omitted).
234
Id. at 634 n.148 (“noting that subsidized speech is treated more like government speech
if government expression is primary purpose of program and is treated more like private
speech if purpose is to create forum for private speech” (citing Leslie Gielow Jacobs, The
Public Sensibilities Forum, 95 NW. U. L. REV. 1357, 1358-59 (2001))).
235

Id. at 631.

236

See Downs v. L.A. Unified Sch. Dist., 228 F.3d 1003, 1016 (9th Cir. 2000). Through
the political process, members of the board and state legislatures can be voted out of office,
and until they are voted out, they are the speakers. See id.
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community members also can hold local officials responsible for what happens in
public schools, usually by expressing dissatisfaction at publicly-held meetings.237
The government is not just accountable at the local level, but accountability is seen
on the state level (through assessment movements) and on the federal level (through
acts, such as No Child Left Behind).238 All of these mandated guidelines are in place
to ensure that the government remains accountable and bears the ultimate
responsibility for speech in the classroom.239
Applicability of Rust hinges on the fact that when the government uses private
speakers to convey a particular message, that speech is government speech. In
public education, the government does not create a program to encourage private
speech,240 but rather, the government uses private speakers (teachers) to convey the
particular message prescribed by the government (curriculum), such that teachers’
speech in the classroom is government speech.241
3. State and Local Governments Control Instructional Speech, Not Teachers
The responsibility of formulating and executing a curriculum is vested with local
school boards and state legislatures,242 while the responsibility of implementing the
curriculum is vested with teachers.243 The government regulates educational
institutions by selecting moral values and theories and by imposing restrictions on
teachers and students.244 Consequently, the content of public education is attributed
to “constitutional, statutory, and regulatory provisions at the state level [and]
curricular decisions of local school boards.”245 When school boards prescribe the
way the curriculum is taught, individual teachers do not have a First Amendment

237

Id.

238

See Todd A. DeMitchell & Terri A. DeMitchell, Statutes and Standards: Has the Door
to Educational Malpractice Been Opened?, 2003 BYU EDUC & L.J. 485, 486 & n.6 (2003).
239

See id. at 486. State legislators and the federal government put into place these
standardized tests because legislators felt that this would be the best way to ensure that schools
were doing their job. Id. If the student individually fails, that student will not be promoted, so
in a sense, each individual can be held accountable for his/her own scores. Id. at 487.
Speaking as a general matter though, the school board bears the ultimate responsibility
because if too many students fail and the school gets a failing grade, then it is the
responsibility of the school to make changes and restructure the school. Id. But see Susan P.
Stuart, Citizen Teacher: Damned if You Do, Damned if You Don’t, 76 U. CIN. L. REV. 1281,
1337 (2008), for an argument that there is no reason to hold teachers accountable for test
results, as teachers do not have control or discretion over the curriculum they teach.
240
See Legal Servs. Corp. v. Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533 (2001); Rosenberger v. Rectors &
Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819 (1995).
241

See Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 833 (citing Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 194 (1991)).

242

DeMitchell & DeMitchell, supra note 238, at 509.

243

Buss, supra note 58, at 256.

244

John Fee, Speech Discrimination, 85 B.U. L. REV. 1103, 1138 (2005).

245
Randall P. Bezanson & William G. Buss, The Many Faces of Government Speech, 86
IOWA L. REV. 1377, 1420 (2001).
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right to “preempt the decisions of their superiors” and speak outside the
curriculum.246
When the educational institution decides the content of the education it
prescribes, it is the government speaking through the state and school board, and the
government is thus entitled to regulate the content of that speech when it enlists
private speakers (i.e., teachers) to convey that message.247 The government usually
relies upon the credibility of third-party sources to illustrate, bolster, and explain the
government’s position,248 and school systems are no different. When school systems
hire teachers, they are entrusting those teachers to teach the set state-defined ideas,
issues, values, and subjects;249 therefore, it follows that teachers’ instructional speech
is a function of employment.250 When teachers speak in a way that does not meet
government approval, the school systems’ educational missions are not only
undermined, but teachers are also interfering with the school boards’ managerial
authority and responsibilities.251 Under Rust, when the government makes a choice
about what is or is not to be said in the classroom, the government is allowed to
enforce that choice.252 Furthermore, “because K-12 schools ‘speak’ more on the
government’s behalf than independently, there are limitations on what the state can
teach in K-12 schools because the state must remain neutral.”253 It is important to
ensure that the state stay neutral. To ensure neutrality, teachers should have no right
to speak outside of the limitations placed on them by the government.
Teachers are not subjected to the certain safeguards in the educational system of
school boards and state legislatures. Specifically, school boards and state
legislatures are held accountable through the democratic process, whereas teachers
are not.254 Through elections, those who prescribe the curriculum answer to the
246

Waldman, supra note 69, at 87 (“Although a teacher’s First Amendment right allows
him to say what he wishes outside the classroom, the inmates do not run the asylum. If a
school board or principal decides that a particular subject is to be taught in a particular way,
individual teachers do not have a constitutional right in the classroom to preempt the decisions
of their superiors.” (citing Martin H. Redish & Kevin Finnerty, What Did You Learn in School
Today? Free Speech, Values Inculcation, and the Democratic-Educational Paradox, 88
CORNELL L. REV. 62, 67 (2002))).
247
Edwards v. Cal. Univ. of Pa., 156 F.3d 488, 491-92 (3d Cir. 1998) (quoting
Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 833-34 (1995)).
248

Norton, supra note 219, at 617.

249

Id.; Zouhary, supra note 232, at 2256.

250

Stuart, supra note 239, at 1337 (“[T]eachers’ curriculum delivery has become a
function of employment not a function of education. Instead, the teachers are now just
government speakers, and the rigor required of the curriculum lies entirely with the school
board.”).
251

Buss, supra note 58, at 242.

252

Stuller, supra note 210, at 331.

253

Jeltema, supra note 206, at 231 (footnote omitted).

254

Downs v. L.A. Unified Sch. Dist., 228 F.3d 1003, 1016 (9th Cir. 2000) (quoting Bd. of
Regents of the Univ. of Wis. Sys. v. Southworth, 529 U.S. 217, 235 (2000)); see also supra
notes 236-58 and accompanying text.
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people, so that what the government decides should be taught and said in the
classroom does not go unchecked.255 “Moreover, it cannot be accepted as a premise
that the student is voluntarily in the classroom and willing to be exposed to a
teaching method which, though reasonable, is not approved by the school
authorities.”256 Although it is impossible for teachers to educate without speaking,257
it does not follow that teachers have a constitutional right to present personal views
against the directions of elected officials.258 It would be illogical to allow teachers to
“get the last word in” the curriculum.259
Many proponents of the Hazelwood and Pickering tests believe that these tests
ensure some form of academic freedom, which is questionably an essential part of
the educational process.260 There is much debate among scholars on the importance
of academic freedom and whether or not academic freedom should be a
constitutional right or whether it can be raised as a defense in legal proceedings.261
Even assuming there is some right to academic freedom, that right does not belong to
teachers, but rather the right belongs to institutions.262 The Rust test ensures that
teachers cannot speak their own views outside of the government prescribed
curriculum in the name of academic freedom, regardless of whether the speech is
related to pedagogical or public concerns.263
4. Rust’s Application: The Problem with Specifics
Although teachers’ convey government messages when they are teaching in the
classroom,264 the lack of specificity in the messages presents an obstacle in applying
the Rust test. In Rust and its line of precedent, the content of the government speech
has a very narrow focus.265 Conversely though, in instructional speech, the
255
Downs, 228 F.3d at 1016. The Supreme Court has recognized this concept as well,
noting that: “When the government speaks . . . to promote its own policies or to advance a
particular idea, it is, in the end, accountable to the electorate and the political process for its
advocacy. If the citizenry objects, newly elected officials later could espouse some different
or contrary position.” Fee, supra note 244, at 1168 n.295 (quoting Southworth, 529 U.S. at
235).
256
Stuller, supra note 210, at 335 (quoting Mailloux v. Kiley, 323 F. Supp. 1387, 1392 (D.
Mass. 1971).
257

Bezanson & Buss, supra note 245, at 1420.

258

Mayer v. Monroe County Cmty. Sch. Corp., 474 F.3d 477, 480 (7th Cir. 2007).

259

Buss, supra note 58, at 241-49.

260

R. George Wright, The Emergence of First Amendment Academic Freedom, 85 NEB. L.
REV. 793, 799 (2007); see generally Stuart, supra note 239 (explaining that when academic
freedom is examined under curricular issues, teachers’ academic freedom, which is vital to the
educational process, will be threatened).
261

See supra note 60.

262

Weidner, supra note 201, at 263.

263

Id.

264

Bezanson & Buss, supra note 245, at 1421.

265

Buss, supra note 58, at 260. For example, doctors could not engage in speech
specifically about “abortion-related activities” in Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 175 (1991),
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government controls the broad, or macro message, but it does not exert control on
the specific, or micro message.266 Even though the government controls the subjects
that are taught in the classroom, as well as the point of views presented in those
subjects,267 it stops quite short of providing teachers’ with a “script” of what to say in
the classroom.268 A problem with the Rust test is that when applying it to teachers’
speech, the test would allow the government to ensure that teachers’ do not distort a
particular government message, even though no government message is specifically
laid out.269 A further problem arises in the absence of specific guidelines about what
teachers can and cannot say in the classroom: it can be difficult to “disentangle what
. . . [teachers] say[] on the basis of delegated authority from that which reflects [the
teachers’] personal views.”270 The realities of teaching, such as unanticipated
questions or comments from students, make it hard for the government to regulate
teachers’ speech, which the Rust test does not take into account.271 Despite these
limitations, the Rust test is still a better fit for instructional speech cases as the ability
of local and state governments to effectively control the subjects and point of views
that are taught in the school “is largely measured by [the government’s] ability to
control teacher speech.”272
5. Promoting Judicial and Political Economy with the Rust Test
The authority to determine whether or not and to what extent teachers’ speech is
protected should not be in the hands of judges, but rather in the hands of professional
educators, such as the school and state, as well as the general public.273 The
decision-making process for determining what is permissible to say in the classroom
involves issues, which are more “subjective and evaluative than typical issues
presented in disciplinary decisions and . . . such academic judgments should be left
to professional educators.”274 Judges should, therefore, leave these types of decisions
to educational experts: the state legislatures and school boards.275 Although courts

and artists could not use funds to create art that violated “standards of decency and respect” in
National Endowment of the Arts v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569, 573 (1998).
266

Bezanson & Buss, supra note 245, at 1422.

267

Id. at 1421-22 (“With education, the message is selected by a government agent and is
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traditionally decline to “micromanage” educational decisions,276 lawsuits are
constantly filed concerning what teachers can and cannot say in the classroom.277
Rust ensures a straight-forward and uncomplicated test, which would in turn cut
down on the number of lawsuits filed and heard against schools that are “already
over-burdened and cash-strapped.”278 Realistically, the only time judges should
intervene into educational matters is to protect students rights;279 otherwise, the
primary educational authority rests with state and local governments.
Along with the professional educators, decisions of what should be said in the
classroom should belong to the local communities. Local control of public education
is in place to promote the values of the local communities.280 As the Supreme Court
has recognized, school boards have a “legitimate and substantial community interest
in promoting respect for authority and traditional values be they social, moral or
political.”281 The public has an interest in ensuring that certain values are promoted
and local officials carry the risk of being voted out of office for failure to promote
those values.282 When teachers talk in the classroom, they are speaking on behalf of
the government; therefore, what the government can say is not a constitutional issue
left to judges to determine but should be left to the public and the political process.283
V. CONCLUSION
Teachers may not necessarily “shed their constitutional rights to freedom of
speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate,”284 but they do shed their constitutional
rights to freedom of speech the moment they start teaching in the classroom.
Although the Hazelwood and Pickering tests ensure this in some situations, the Rust
test is the only test that will consistently result in teachers having no First
Amendment protections in the classroom.
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When the government funds a program, such as public education, the government
has a right to ensure that the message is not distorted by teachers’ personal views and
beliefs. This is not to say that teachers can never express personal views. Outside of
the classroom, teachers’ rights are protected by the First Amendment;285 however, no
such protection exists in the classroom. Students in elementary and secondary
schools are very impressionable, and because of this, state and local governments
must take many measures to ensure that the messages that students receive are
appropriate and reflect the views of the public as a whole. It is illogical that teachers
can present completely biased views not reflective of the state and local governments
views’ and then claim that the First Amendment permits them to do so.
The application of the Rust test will not only force teachers to be more conscious
of what they say, but it will also free state and local governments from the fear that
teachers will constantly undermine the government’s authority. Although the Rust
test is not perfect, it is the most logical test to apply in terms of the context behind
the development of the test. As such, the question as to the extent of teachers’ First
Amendment protections of instructional speech does not even need to be examined
because application of the Rust test will always result in teachers having no First
Amendment protection in the classroom.

285

See Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 573-74 (1998).

https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol58/iss1/7

32

